Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to examine the value relevance of accounting information in cases of apparent audit failures. Design/methodology/approach -The authors adopt the bootstrapping technique and compare the value relevance of key accounting information across samples of firms experiencing apparent audit failures with matched non-audit failure firms. Findings -Accounting information is found to be less value relevant for firms experiencing apparent audit failures, regardless of auditor reputation. Research limitations/implications -This study has limitations due to the ex ante research approach adopted. Future research could address this issue by possibly incorporating an "intervening" factor into the model to indicate how the market can differentiate audit failure firms from other firms. Originality/value -The paper gives support to the assertion that the market appears to rely less on accounting numbers when audit failures occur, even though formal allegations of audit failure may not appear until years after their occurrence. In addition to contributing to value-relevance research by providing empirical evidence for the market phenomenon around the time of material misstatements, the paper demonstrates an innovative application of bootstrapping to test for differences in R 2 .
I. Introduction
DeAngelo (1981, p. 186 ) defines audit quality as "the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client's accounting system, and (b) report the breach." However, assessment of quality for particular audit engagements remains somewhat murky, due to the nature of the audit process, the reporting of audit outcomes, and users' response to the auditor's reputation (i.e. a Big vs non-Big dichotomous audit quality measurement). Previous studies have examined the association between audit quality and earnings response coefficients (Teoh and Wong, 1993) . The empirical results appear to support that the market responds positively to reputable auditors.
However, whether auditor reputation could serve as a reliable proxy for audit quality may be unknown due to the high-profile audit failures which occurred during the downturn in the financial markets a decade ago. Many notorious firms, for instance, Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, were audited by Big five auditors with reputations similar or even superior to those of the non-Big five. Thus, one might conclude that an auditor's reputation may actually hinder the market's ability to assess the reliability of accounting information.
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether auditor reputation affects the value relevance of accounting information in cases of apparent audit failures. For the purpose of this study, apparent audit failures are defined as instances that an auditor issues an unqualified opinion on materially misstated financial statements. Since apparent audit failures indicate poor audit quality, they offer an opportunity to explore the association between stock prices and accounting information given low audit quality. Therefore, this study compares ex ante value relevance of accounting information of publicly held US firms experiencing apparent audit failures with a matched group of firms not experiencing such failures. Ex ante value relevance refers to value relevance of accounting information prior to the discovery of audit failures. Matching audit failure firms with non-audit failure firms allows audit quality to be evaluated on a "service-by-service" basis, consistent with the suggestion of Lam and Chang (1994) .
This study differs from previous studies on market reactions to news of audit failures, accounting scandals, or earnings restatements (Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Dechow et al., 1996; Feroz et al., 1991) . Instead of examining stock market reactions to the news of audit failures, we focus on examining value relevance of accounting information in the alleged periods of misstatement. Those alleged periods are the reporting periods when audited financial statements contain material misstatements. We compare firms experiencing apparent audit failures with matched firms without audit failures in the same periods in order to find whether there is a difference in value relevance of accounting information prior to audit failures becoming public. Therefore, this is an exploratory study that aims to examine market reactions around the time when financial statements contain misstatements. In addition, we divided our sample into sub-samples classified by auditor types (i.e. Big 8/6/5/4 auditors vs non-Big 8/6/5/4 auditors) and conduct the same comparisons to investigate whether such a difference is conditioned on auditor reputation.
Several sources are used to identify apparent audit failures (in these cases, an auditor issues an unqualified opinion on materially misstated financial statements). These sources include the US Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), financial statements restatements because of past misstatements, and litigation against auditors due to audit failures.
Consistent with prior research (Collins et al., 1997 (Collins et al., , 1999 Rees, 1999; Rajgopal et al., 2002) , value relevance is measured by the explanatory power of contemporaneous earnings and book values for stock prices (i.e. the regression of stock price on earnings and book values). We apply a bootstrapping analysis to test data collected. The results of this analysis indicate that the accounting information of firms experiencing apparent audit failures is generally less value relevant than that of a matched group of firms not experiencing such failures. Results of sub-sample comparisons further indicate that the audit reputation may not be essential because the market appears to discount less reliable accounting information. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Apparent audit failures
Section II describes prior research pertaining to market perceptions of audit quality. Section III contains the development of the research hypothesis. Section IV discusses data collection and the research methodology. Section V presents statistical analysis and empirical results. Section VI provides concluding remarks.
II. Prior research
Previous studies of audit failures have focused on market reactions to the announcements of earnings restatements, fraud class actions, and SEC enforcement actions (Liu et al., 2009; Akhigbe et al., 2005; Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Dechow et al., 1996; Bhagat et al., 1994; Francis et al., 1994; Kellogg, 1984) . Overall, these studies have documented a negative market reaction to such announcements. For example, Francis et al. (1994) find a negative market response to the corrective disclosure of firms experiencing class action litigation. Feroz et al. (1991) document a 10 percent decline in stock prices at announcements of accounting violations. Akhigbe et al. (2005) find that earnings restatements lead to a negative market response and that the negative response is conditioned on the content of earnings management. Liu et al. (2009) find that shareholders are more likely to vote against the ratification of the auditor following an audit failure. In spite of these findings, none of these studies examine market reactions before accounting violations or audit failures became public knowledge. Chaney and Philipich (2002) examine the reputation effect of the Enron audit failure. Specifically, they investigate the impact of auditor reputation on the market prices of Arthur Andersen's clients around the Enron bankruptcy. After Andersen's reputation was damaged, its clients experienced a significant drop in their stock prices. The result of Chaney and Philipich (2002) appears to indicate that market perception of reliability of accounting information is conditioned on market perception of auditor reputation.
Recently, Griffin et al. (2004) investigate the impact of class action litigation of audit failures on stock returns and earnings-returns relation in the alleged periods. They find that the market responds positively to releases of misleading accounting information. As Griffin et al. point out, the primary reason for this result is that the market initially accepts the misstated information. Furthermore, the ex post negative reaction to class action lawsuit announcement is conditioned on the returns-earnings relation in the alleged periods.
In summary, except for Griffin et al (2004) , most previous studies have focused on market reactions around news releases of audit failures instead of examining the market reaction to misstated earnings in the alleged periods. To yield additional insights for the literature, the purpose of this study is to explore value relevance of accounting information when financial statements contain material misstatements. Specifically, we examine the contemporaneous association between stock prices and misstated accounting information in the periods with alleged misstatement. This study differs from other audit failure studies in the following aspects:
. Instead of focusing on ex post market reactions to audit failures, this study examines the market perception of the information quality ex ante.
. Instead of using an event study approach, this study examines the association between stock prices and accounting information in a longer window.
. This study also provides evidence on whether market perception of information quality in the alleged periods is conditioned on auditor reputation.
III. Development of hypothesis
Because apparent audit failures are less ambiguous, they provide a unique way of testing the market's perception of accounting information quality ex ante driven by poor audit quality. Using firms not experiencing apparent audit failures as benchmarks, this study examines whether the value relevance of accounting information is different for firms experiencing apparent audit failures from those of benchmarked firms. In this study, value relevance indicates the extent to which accounting information explains the variation of market prices. When financial statement users perceive higher information quality, therefore more reliable financial statements, accounting information such as earnings and book values should explain more of the variation in stock prices.
The Ohlson (1995) model is used to test the value relevance of accounting information (Amir, 1996; Amir and Lev, 1996; Collins et al., 1997 Collins et al., , 1999 Rees, 1999; Rajgopal et al., 2002) . The Ohlson model relates a firm's market value to its contemporaneous accounting information. Specifically, this model provides a structure to study the relationship between equity values and earnings, as well as its relationship with book values (Stober, 1999) . The degree of value relevance is measured by the R 2 of the Ohlson model (Collins et al., 1997; Rees, 1999; Rajgopal et al., 2002) . The R 2 measures the degree of the variation in the dependent variable explained by independent variables. If the perceived information quality (i.e. audit quality) is low, the association between stock price and accounting information, hence the R 2 of the Ohlson model, should be weak because accounting information will be viewed as less reliable.
Owing to the exploratory nature of this study, we state our hypothesis in its null form:
H0. There is no difference between the explanatory power of earnings and book values for stock prices of firms experiencing apparent audit failures and firms not experiencing apparent audit failures.
IV. Data collection and methodology
Cases of apparent audit failures and the matched control group Firms included in this study are selected from the SEC's AAERs and restatements of financial statements found in the Wall Street Journal Index and Lexis-Nexis News Library for fiscal years ending between 1980 and 2000. The initial sample is the combination of these two data sources. AAERs indicate firms whose financial statements containing misstatements documented in the SEC sanctions against firms or their auditors. We exclude AAER cases where quarterly misstatements are the focus of the sanction because quarterly statements are only reviewed, but not audited, by auditors. Restatements consist of firms that restated prior years' financial statements because of significant misstatements. These represent apparent audit failures because auditors did not detect and/or report those material misstatements initially. We searched keywords with the root "restat-" in Wall Street Journal Index and Lexis-Nexis News Library. Quarterly restatements are also excluded from our sample. To ensure that the search of the above two sources did not omit any audit failures; we also searched, as a secondary source, news accounts of auditor litigation including the auditor litigation database compiled by Palmrose (1999) . Cases of litigation against auditors contain allegations that auditors failed to detect and report material misstatements. Such cases are included in this analysis due to possible lags in SEC scrutiny which would ordinarily result in enforcement activity and/or restatements of prior financial statements.
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Accordingly, litigation cases that provide substantial evidence of audit failure are included as apparent audit failures. While lawsuits seeking damages from an auditor are not always indicative of the auditor's failure to adhere to professional standards, such suits may reveal audit failures before subsequent issuance of an AAER. A careful review of the litigation news accounts helped to ensure that only apparent audit failures are captured in the sample.
In order to perform hypothesis testing, all accounting data for the years of the alleged audit failures that are necessary for testing the proposed relation are extracted from the COMPUSTAT database. All stock price information is obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The matched control group is selected based on established matching criteria. These criteria include the year of financial statements, auditor size (Big 8/6/5/4 vs non-Big 8/6/5/4), client industry, and client size. The required accounting data and price information are compiled for the matched control group from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively.
Model specification
The model used to test the hypothesis is Ohlson's (1995) valuation model (Amir, 1996; Amir and Lev, 1996; Collins et al., 1997 Collins et al., , 1999 ). The Ohlson model is expressed as follows:
where: P it ¼ closing stock price of firm i's equity three months after fiscal year end t[1]; EPS it ¼ firm i's reported earnings per share before extraordinary items for period t; BVPS it ¼ firm i's book value of equity per share at time t; 1 it ¼ random error term with mean 0 and variance 1; and a 1 and a 2 ¼ the regression coefficients.
Testing of hypothesis
To test the hypothesis, comparisons are made between the apparent audit failure group of firms and the matched control group of firms not experiencing audit failures. For each comparison, two OLS regressions of the Ohlson model are performed: one regression for the audit failure group, and the other for the matched control group. If the R 2 for the audit failure group is statistically significantly lower than the R 2 for the matched control group, it suggests that value relevance of accounting information is lower in the alleged period and that the market appears to rely less on accounting information in the alleged period when there are material misstatements. If the R 2 for the audit failure group is equal to or higher than the R 2 for the matched control group, it suggests that the market may be "fooled" in the alleged period. Moreover, we examine whether value relevance of accounting information in the alleged period is conditioned on auditor reputation. For example, there might be a greater difference in value relevance of accounting information for firms audited by Big 8/6/5/4 auditors than those audited by non-Big 8/6/5/4 auditors. Comparisons we use to test the hypothesis are summarized in Table I .
Comparison 1 tests whether there is a difference in value relevance of accounting information between the audit failure group and the matched group, in general.
Comparisons 2 and 3 test whether value relevance differs within Big 8/6/5/4 and non-Big 8/6/5/4 groups. Comparisons 4 and 5 directly test whether the difference in value relevance of accounting information between the audit failure group and the matched group is conditioned on auditor size. Our search for financial restatements in the Wall Street Journal Index and the Lexis-Nexis News Library yields 462 unique firms with restatements. Of those 462 firms, 273 unique firms meet the requirements for our analysis. The other 189 firms are deleted for reasons discussed in (1) through (4) above. We then combine the 383 firms sanctioned in the AAERs with the 273 firms disclosing subsequent restatements and find that 42 firms exist in both data sources. Therefore, we identify 614 firms that experienced apparent audit failures from these two data sources. Since our analysis requires accounting data from COMPUSTAT, we first searched for the ticker identification numbers for those 614 firms by their firm names in COMPUSTAT. A total of 154 firms were deleted because they do not have ticker identification numbers[3], leaving 460 firms remaining for further analysis. An additional 297 firms that meet our data requirements are found in the auditor litigation database compiled by Palmrose (1999) [4] . Since 74 of these firms are already included in our 460-firm sample, our overall sample increased to 683 unique firms. All these firms have materially misstated annual financial statements within the period from 1980 to 2000, and their COMPUSTAT ticker identification numbers are available.
V. Analysis and results

Sample selection and characteristics
As this study defines apparent audit failures as cases in which auditors provide unqualified opinions on financial statements that contain material misstatements, a search of the COMPUSTAT database The sample for this study was reduced further because of the absence of other data required to test the hypothesis. To test the hypothesis, earnings per share, book value of stockholders' equity, and stock price data must be available from the COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases. Given these considerations, the resulting sample of apparent audit failures is 346 firms (616 firm/years). Table II reports the sample size and the industry distribution information of sample firms. Given the matched-pairs design used in this study, each audit failure firm in the sample is matched with a control firm based on year of misstated financial statements, industry (SIC code), company size (total assets), and auditor type (Big 8/6/5/4 vs non-Big 8/6/5/4) [6] . To get the matched pairs, we searched for similar size firms (with total assets within 10 percent) in the same industry (two-to four-digit SIC code) in the alleged years [7] . If there is more than one similar size firm available, we select the one with the closest SIC code. If there is no firm of similar size available in the same industry, we select the firm with the closest total assets. In case there is no matched pair available according to our matching criteria, we drop the audit failure observation.
Hypothesis testing
Prior accounting research has used a model's R 2 statistic to measure the value relevance of accounting information (Lang et al., 2003; Sami and Zhou, 2004; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Nwaeze, 1998; Collins et al., 1997; Amir and Lev, 1996; Harris et al., 1994) . These studies have measured value relevance as the R 2 resulting from the regressions of stock prices on per share values of earnings and book values of equity. These studies compare value relevance measured by R 2 either over different time periods or across different samples. In this study, R-squares are compared across audit failure and non-audit failure groups to investigate whether there is a difference in value relevance between the group of firms experiencing apparent audit failures and a matched group of firms that do not experience Lang et al. (2003) and Sami and Zhou (2004) use the procedure demonstrated in Cramer (1987) to obtain the mean and the variance of R 2 . Then, they conduct a z-test to compare the means of two R 2 . A major problem in using the Cramer method in this context of a z-test is that it depends on the assumption of the normal distribution of R 2 . However, the distribution of R 2 is not normal, even asymptotically (Anderson, 2003, p. 155) . As an example, Figure 1 shows an R 2 distribution given an R 2 of 0.9 for a regression model with ten independent variables (sample size ¼ 100). Visual inspection of this figure reveals that the distribution of R 2 is not normal. An additional complication is that calculation of the moments of R 2 , which is required to apply Cramer's method, is prone to computational difficulties that may produce incorrect results, even when the requisite formulae seem to be programmed correctly.
Because of the difficulty and possible unreliability of using the Cramer procedure, this study uses the bootstrap method to create tests for the difference in R 2 . Bootstrapping is a resampling method that requires fewer assumptions than traditional methods. In general, it also provides more accurate results. For example, the bootstrap method does not require normality of the distribution of the R 2 and it can provide a faster convergence to the expected value of the parameter of interest.
Since the models cannot be nested to formally test H 0 : R Barr (1969) illustrates that the length of the confidence intervals for the two-interval test must be constructed with the multiplier:
if the significance level of 0.05 is desired. When the sample sizes of the two samples are the same, i.e. both have n observations, the multiplier becomes:
As a result, the percentage of the confidence intervals is 83.4 percent. Therefore, comparing two 95 percent intervals is incorrect if a ¼ 0.05 is required [8] . 
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Descriptive statistics
The sample selection procedure yields 616 firm/year observations of apparent audit failures, which are matched with a control group in order to test the hypothesis. In the audit failure group, 502 (114) firm/years were audited by Big 8/6/5/4 auditors (non-Big 8/6/5/4 auditors). Table III illustrates the observations included in each comparison [9] . Table IV presents descriptive statistics, including the mean, median, and standard deviation for total assets (TA), stock prices (P), earnings per share (EPS), and book value of equity per share (BVPS) for both groups in each comparison. Table IV also includes a comparison of the means of these variables. Since the distributions of these variables might not be normal, both a two-sample t-test and a nonparametric Wilcoxon test are conducted. In general, the audit failure group and the matched control group are not significantly different in total assets, which reflects a successful control for company size. Because of the matching requirements, the audit failure and non-audit failure groups exhibit different characteristics in firm size, as shown in comparison 4. As stated earlier, in cases where there are no companies available in the same industries with the similar firm sizes as audit failure observations, we select matched pairs with the closest total assets. Consistent with the tendency of larger firms to have Big 8/6/5/4 auditors, comparison 4 shows that the average company size of the audit failure group is significantly larger than that of the matched control group. In comparison 5, the Wilcoxon test results show a significant difference in company size, while the two-sample t-test does not indicate a significant difference. The control firms also appear to earn more than the audit failure firms. With the exception of comparison 3, the matched control groups have a higher EPS than the audit failure group. Notes: All p-values less than or equal to 0.05 are shown in italics; a both p-values of the two-sample t-test and the nonparametric two-sample Wilcoxon test are given; TA, total asset at the end of the fiscal year t; P, stock price, three month after the end of the fiscal year t; EPS, earnings per share excluding extraordinary items for fiscal year t; BVPS, book value of equity per share at the end of the fiscal year t Table IV . Descriptive statistics for observations included in hypothesis testing Apparent audit failures 8/6/5/4 auditors appear to have a bimodal distribution, a probability distribution characterized by two humps rather than the more common single hump that characterizes the normal distribution. One hump is near 0.15 and the other is near 0.46. Since we run bootstrap regressions by resampling the residuals from the original regression, the bimodal distribution of R 2 appears to be driven by an outlier in the residuals. Examining the regression output, we find one residual with an extreme value. The bimodality exists when a highly influential point is included in some bootstrap resamples but not in others. When we delete this outlier, the bimodal distribution of R 2 disappears. The histogram of R 2 after removing the outlier is shown in Figure 6 . As stated earlier, one advantage of bootstrap methods is that they do not require distributions to be normal. Hence, the above descriptions of a non-normal pattern are not troublesome. To create 83.4 percent bootstrap percentile confidence intervals, the 1,000 R 2 * s from bootstrap regressions were sorted in an ascending order. The lower value of the confidence interval is the 83rd (0.083 * 1,000) R 2 * and the upper value is the 917th (0.917 * 1,000) R 2 * . The results of the bootstrap percentile confidence intervals are shown in Table V . Comparisons of bootstrap percentile confidence intervals indicate that there are significant differences in R 2 for the audit failure groups and the matched control groups [12] .
Hypothesis testing using the Cramer procedure To be consistent with prior literature (Harris et al., 1994; Lang et al., 2003; Sami and Zhou, 2004) , we perform the test using the Cramer procedure. Cramer (1987) provides a procedure , we can calculate the z-statistic as in Harris et al. (1994) and Lang et al. (2003) and compare means of R 2 across two samples. The expression of a z-test can be modified as follows since the number of observations of R 2 is only one for each sample: The results using the Cramer procedure and z-test are presented in Table VI . These results are similar to those reported by employing the bootstrap method. Therefore, our results are robust [13] . As discussed in McCullough and Vinod (1993) , caution should be given when using the Cramer procedure to calculate the mean and standard deviation of the R 2 . For instance, we encountered computer operation overflows, resulting in incorrect outputs, before we modified our programming to resolve such problems. 
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Sensitivity analysis
To ensure that our analyses are not affected by potentially confounding factors such as negative earnings or financial distress, we perform several additional analyses. First, as shown in the descriptive statistics, the audit failure group on average exhibits a lower EPS compared with the matched control group. The frequency of losses in the audit failure group is higher compared with the matched control group. Prior literature (Collins et al., 1999; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Hayn, 1995) has suggested that losses are less informative for prices than profits. Therefore, the relation between stock price and earnings and book values of firms in financial distress may be fundamentally different from non-distressed firms. To ensure that our results are not driven by the relatively higher frequency of losses or a greater degree of financial distress among the firms in the audit failure group, we carry out two additional analyses. First, we performed a second matching of non-audit failure firms to the audit failure group, adding two additional matching criteria, return on assets (ROA) and leverage, to control for the influence of financial distress. We also analyze the data after removing all these observations with negative EPS and their pairs in the matched control group. Notes: R 2 *: audit failure group -non-Big 8/6/5/4; R 2 *: matched control group -Big 8/6/5/4; R 2 *: matched control group -Big 8/6/5/4; after removing the outlier Also, in our original analyses, we include material misstatements that received both "unqualified opinion" and "unqualified opinion with explanatory language" as audit failure cases. Some of the "explanatory language" cases refer to an auditor's substantial doubts about a firm's ability to continue as a going concern. Although the "going concern" opinions are included in the audit failure group, insofar as the auditor's opinion on the fairness of the firm's financial statements is not qualified, it is possible that firms that receive going concern opinions are fundamentally different from the rest of the firms in the sample. While we already control for financial distress factor by adding ROA and financial leverage as two additional matching criteria, we perform additional analyses after removing all firms with going concern opinions and their matched pairs in the control group, in order to exclude the possibility that our results are driven by some other confounding factor associated with the going concern opinion. Additionally, we find that a few audit failure firms changed their auditors during the period their financial statements were misstated. It is possible that these firms might be different from other firms because they might be priced differently due to the change in auditors. Previous research (Teoh, 1992) has documented that auditor changes might affect stock prices and therefore the association between stock prices and accounting information. Schwartz and Menon (1985) examine the motivations for auditor switching and consider financial distress as a factor that affects auditor switching. Also, there are other factors, such as audit opinion qualification (Chow and Rice, 1982 ) that might trigger auditor switching. Therefore, in addition to controlling for financial distress, we also analyze the data without those firms that changed auditors during their misstatement years. The results of all these additional analyses are consistent with our original analyses, which support our hypothesis [14] . 
VI. Limitations and conclusions Limitations
This study has limitations due to the ex ante research approach adopted. Because of this ex ante approach, our matching criteria have to rely on the "noisy" accounting measure, total assets, in the alleged years. Therefore, the matching might not be effective in controlling for size. Although our primary objective is to explore the market phenomenon around the time of material misstatements, exploring why the market discounted accounting information reported by audit failure firms even the news of these misstatements is also Notes: All p-values less than or equal to 0.05 shown in italics; regression model: P it ¼ a 1 EPS it þ a 2 BVPS it ; a in comparisons 2 and 4, audit failure group is the same group except the number of observations differs; failure group in both comparisons represents firms audited by Big auditors; in comparison 4, we dropped some failure group firms since we cannot find the matched pairs audited by non-Big auditors; b in comparisons 3 and 5, audit failure group is the same group since it represents audit failure firms audited by non-Big auditors; c the number of observations is due to deleting an outlier existing in the matched control group and its pair in the audit failure group; similar to the bootstrap testing results, z-statistic is not significant before deleting the outlier because the large magnitude of the variance of the R 2 for the matched control group, 0.1939 an important question. Future research could address this issue by possibly incorporating an "intervening" factor into the model to indicate how the market can differentiate audit failure firms from other firms. Finally, our analysis is based on the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period and therefore caution must be exercised when generalizing the findings of this study to the post-SOX period.
Conclusions
In this study, we examine whether there is a difference in value relevance of accounting information between firms experiencing apparent audit failures and firms that have not experienced apparent audit failures. The bootstrap method is used to test for differences in R 2 across samples. The results suggest that the value relevance of earnings and book values of equity is lower for firms experiencing apparent audit failures than those for firms that have not experienced apparent audit failures. Although the market may exhibit a lower level of confidence in accounting information from firms audited by non-Big 8/6/5/4 auditors, the results provide evidence that the market generally exhibits lower confidence in firms experiencing audit failure, regardless of their auditors' size. These empirical results show that the explanatory power of accounting information of firms experiencing apparent auditor failures is lower than that of firms that have not experienced apparent auditor failures.
In our view, the market appears to rely less on accounting information reported by firms experiencing apparent audit failures regardless of auditor size, even though an apparent audit failure may not be confirmed by future actions and events until well after its occurrence. Moreover, in comparison 4, accounting information provided by firms experiencing audit failures and audited by Big 8/6/5/4 auditors is less value relevant compared with firms audited by non-Big 8/6/5/4 auditors that have not experienced audit failures. This result suggests the difference in value relevance between the audit failure group and the matched groups is not conditioned on auditor size. Thus, as illustrated in comparisons 1 through 5, the results indicate that there is a difference in value relevance between the audit failure and the matched group ex ante.
In addition to providing evidence suggesting that auditor size does not impact the value relevance of accounting information in a dysfunctional manner, this study demonstrates an innovative application of bootstrapping to test for differences in R 2 in the context of value-relevance research. We believe this method may allow researchers to make more precise conclusions when conducting future value-relevance studies.
Notes
1. According to SEC requirements, before September 2002, Form 10-K had to be filed within 90 days after the end of the company's fiscal year.
2. Several AAERs do not identify firm names. Further, some firms received multiple AAER sanctions. There are also some cases where the alleged impropriety involves a governmental entity.
3. Having ticker identification numbers does not necessarily mean that these firms have all required data for specific years in question available in COMPUSTAT.
4. Palmrose's (1999) database provides tickers for those companies that have ticker identification numbers in COMPUSTAT. We exclude those cases of apparent audit failure which do not have tickers in the Palmrose (1999) database.
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